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A NEW EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIVITY
PROVISION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT - Woodson v. Rowland
INTRODUCTION
The case of Woodson v. Rowland presents the issue of whether
the family of an injured employee may bring a civil action against
the employer to recover damages for the death or injury of the em-
ployee, when coverage and compliance under the North Carolina
Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) exist.1 The opinion of the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Woodson, decided on August 14,
1991, allows a worker's family to bring a civil suit against the em-
ployer to recover damages.2 Woodson overruled previous case law
which held that simultaneous pursuit of civil and workers' com-
pensation claims is not allowed.-
Prior to Woodson, employers were immune from damage suits
filed by their employees when coverage existed under the North
Carolina Workers' Compensation Act." However, employees were
able to recover benefits under workers compensation without a
showing of negligence on the part of the employer as the cause of
their injuries.5 Under Woodson, when an employer intentionally
engages in misconduct knowing it is substantially certain to cause
serious injury or death to employees, an injured employee, or the
personal representative of that employee, may pursue civil action
against the employer.' Such civil actions will not be barred by the
exclusivity provision of the Act.7 The court held that it is was not
inherently inconsistent to assert that the same injury to an em-
ployee was both a result of an intentional tort, and an accident
under the Act.' This conclusion made both remedies available, and
made the exclusivity provision of the Act unavailable to bar the
1. Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 334, 407 S.E.2d 224 (1991).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233.
4. Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985).
5. Id.
6. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228.
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civil action.9 However, the decision does only allow one recovery by
the employee, meaning the employee may not recover fully from
both compensation under the Act and a civil action against the
employer."0
THE CASE
Woodson v. Rowland concerned a wrongful death action aris-
ing from a work-related trench cave-in which resulted in the death
of one of the workers, Thomas Alfred Sprouse." One of the de-
fendants, Pinnacle One Associates, (Pinnacle One), was the devel-
oper on the construction project.1 2 Pinnacle One retained Davidson
& Jones, Inc., (Davidson & Jones), as the general contractor, was
also named as a defendant.13 The defendant Morris Rowland Util-
ity, Inc., (Rowland Utility) or (employer), was hired by Davidson &
Jones to dig a sanitary sewer line for one aspect of the project."
The president and sole shareholder of Rowland Utility is defend-
ant Neal Morris Rowland, (Morris Rowland). The decedent was an
employee of Rowland Utility.'6
Workers from both Rowland Utility and Davidson & Jones
were digging trenches for the sewer lines on August 3, 1985.16
There were two trench sites, one manned by Rowland Utility and
the other by Davidson & Jones.17 The foreman for Davidson &
Jones would not allow his men to work in the trenches because
they "were not sloped, shored or braced, and did not have a trench
box," as required by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
North Carolina and the rules promulgated thereunder.' 8 After the
refusal to work by the foreman of Davidson & Jones, Morris Row-
land procured a trench box for the Davidson Crew, but not for his
own crew.' The following morning, August 4, 1985, only the Row-
land Utility crew reported to the site and began work. 0 Morris
9. Id.
10. Id. at 341, 407 S.E.2d at 228.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 334, 407 S.E.2d at 225.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 335, 407 S.E.2d at 225.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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Rowland was present at the site.21 At 9:45 a.m., one side of the
trench collapsed, completely burying Sprouse and partially burying
the man closest to him.2 2 The workers pulled out the man who was
partially buried but could not dig out Sprouse for several hours
and by the time they finished, he was dead.23 The plaintiff and
administrator of the decedent Sprouse's estate, Susie Mae Wood-
son, filed civil suits against Rowland Utility, Morris Rowland indi-
vidually, Davidson & Jones, and Pinnacle One Associates.2 ' The
plaintiff also filed a Worker's Compensation claim with the specific
request that the Industrial Commission not hear her case until the
completion of the civil action.2 5 The Commission complied with
her request and the plaintiff has not received any compensation
under the Act.26
The principle question in this case concerns whether or not
the exclusivity provisions of the North Carolina Worker's Compen-
sation Act would limit the recovery available to the plaintiff to
those remedies provided under the Act.17 The lower courts held
that the Act so limited the plaintiff's choice of remedies. 2 The Su-
perior Court, Durham County, allowed summary judgments in
favor of all the defendants. 29 The court of appeals then affirmed
the lower court, holding that the civil claim was barred by the ex-
clusivity provision of the Act, and the plaintiff appealed to the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina.30 The court of appeals decision
held that the plaintiff could not sue a co-employee, here Morris
Rowland, individually in tort where the co-employee was the sole
shareholder in the corporation and was the alter ego of the corpo-
rate employer, Rowland Utility, thus making the co-employee es-
sentially the employer for purposes of the Act's exclusivity provi-
sion.31 The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the court of
appeals' decision in part and affirmed it in part.2 The court af-
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 336, 407 S.E.2d at 226.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Woodson v. Rowland, 92 N.C. App. 38, 373 S.E.2d 674 (1988).
31. Id. at 44, 373 S.E.2d at 677-78.
32. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 360, 407 S.E.2d at 240.
1992]
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firmed the court of appeals' decision insofar as it allowed summary
judgments in favor of Pinnacle One, and in favor of Davidson &
Jones on claims of negligent hiring and retention.3 The court re-
versed the court of appeals insofar as it affirmed the summary
judgments of the trial court in favor of Rowland Utility and Morris
Rowland, and in favor of Davidson & Jones on the plaintiff's
breach of nondelegable duty of safety claim. 34 The court then re-
manded the case concerning these defendants for further proceed-
ings in accordance with the opinion. 5 The court held that "when
an employer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is sub-
stantially certain to cause serious injury or death to employees and
an employee is injured or killed by that misconduct, that em-
ployee, or the personal representative of the estate in case of
death, may pursue a civil action against the employer. 6 The court
further held that such conduct is tantamount to an intentional tort
and any civil actions based on such conduct are not barred by the
exclusivity provisions of the Act. 37 The court reasoned that the
plaintiff need not choose between her claim under the Act and her
civil action because "the evidence tended to show that:
(1)Sprouse's death was the result of both an "accident" under the
Act and an intentional tort; and (2) the Act's exclusivity provision
does not shield the employer from civil liability for an intentional
tort."3 8 The court further held that there may be only one recovery
in order to prevent double redress for a single wrong.3
BACKGROUND
The issue of concern here is whether the family of an injured
employee may bring a civil action against the employer to recover
damages for the death or injury of the employee, and simultane-
ously pursue a claim for compensation under the Act."0 N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-10.1 is referred to as an "exclusivity provision,"" which
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228.
37. Id. at 341, 407 S.E.2d at 228.
38. Id. at 337, 407 S.E.2d at 226.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 334, 407 S.E.2d at 224.
41. Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 315 N.C. 500, 506, 340 S.E.2d 295, 299
(1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1985) provides:
If the employee and the employer are subject to and have complied with
264 [Vol. 14:261
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has been commented upon by other writers."' North Carolina
courts have held that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 is designed to
carry out the purpose of the Act, which is to provide limited bene-
fits to an employee for injury by an accident arising out of and in
the course of employment, regardless of negligence or fault on the
part of the employer and at the same time to limit the liability of
the employer, depriving the employee of certain rights he had at
common law.43 However, the Act does not limit any common law
right of the employee, even as against the employer, which pertains
to the employee as a member of the general public, disconnected
with the employment."" In a recent case, this court held that the
plaintiff's remedies under the Act were exclusive and that an em-
ployee was precluded from filing an independent negligence action
against the employer because the employee had already recovered
under the Act.' 5 North Carolina courts have enforced the exclusiv-
ity provision in other cases.46 Exclusivity clauses of this nature
have been held to be constitutional under both the equal protec-
the provisions of this Article, then the rights and remedies herein
granted to the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or personal repre-
sentative shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his
dependents, next of kin, or personal representative as against the em-
ployer at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death.
42. 2A ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION [hereinafter
LARSON] § 65.14, at 12-15, states:
The operative fact in establishing exclusiveness is that of actual cover-
age, not of election to claim compensation in a particular case. Even if
the employee himself has never made application for compensation, his
right to sue his employer at common law is barred by the existence of the
compensation remedy.
LARSON § 65.11, at 12-1 states:
Once a workers' compensation act has become applicable either through
compulsion or election, it affords the exclusive remedy for injury by the
employee or his dependents against the employer and insurance carrier.
This is part of the quid pro quo in which the sacrifices and gains of em-
ployees and employers are to some extent put in balance, for, while the
employer assumes a new liability without fault, he is relieved of the pros-
pect of large damage verdicts.
43. Brown v. Motor Inns of Carolina, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 118, 266 S.E.2d 849
(1980); Bryant v. Dougherty, 267 N.C. 540, 148 S.E.2d 553 (1966).
44. Bryant, 267 N.C. 548, 148 S.E.2d 551 (1966); Barber v. Minge's, 223 N.C.
216, 25 S.E.2d 839 (1943).
45. Freeman v. SCM Corp., 311 N.C. 294, 316 S.E.2d 81 (1984).
46. Hicks v. Guilford County, 267 N.C. 364, 148 S.E.2d 240 (1966); Bryant,
267 N.C. 545, 148 S.E.2d 548 (1966); Wesley v. Lea, 252 N.C. 540, 114 S.E.2d 350
(1960); Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 73 S.E.2d 886 (1953).
1992]
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tion and due process clauses of the Federal Constitution.'7 Profes-
sor Larson has commented on the apparent harshness of this rule
under workers' compensation acts, and notes:
If these decisions seem rather strict, one must remind oneself
that what is being tested here is not the gravity or depravity of
the employer's conduct, but rather the narrow issue of intentional
versus accidental quality of the precise event producing injury.
The intentional removal of a safety device or toleration of a dan-
gerous condition may or may not set the stage for an accidental
injury later. But in any normal use of the words, it cannot be
said, if such an injury does happen, that this was deliberate inflic-
tion of harm comparable to an intentional left jab to the chin."8
The test of liability rests on a consideration of the work connection
versus fault. 9 According to Larson, "[t]he right to compensation
depends on one simple test: Was there a work-connected injury?" 50
Larson also states that "negligence, and, for the most part, fault,
are not in issue and cannot affect the result."51
In order to understand how Woodson has changed the applica-
tion of the exclusivity provision in North Carolina, it is necessary
to look at the history of the provision's use in North Carolina. The
exclusivity provision has been used to forbid the simultaneous pur-
suit of civil actions and workers' compensation claims against the
employer, for injuries to the employee incurred in the course of
employment.52 However, there is an exception to the bar of the ex-
clusivity provision in relation to the employer's liability. The em-
ployee is allowed to bring a civil action against the employer when
his injuries are the result of the deliberate, intentional actions of
the employer.53
The North Carolina Supreme Court has also applied the ex-
clusivity provision to limit the remedies available to employees in-
jured by co-employees. The supreme court ruled that an employee,
injured during the course of employment, is foreclosed from suing
47. LARSON, supra note 42, § 65.20.
48. Id. § 68.13, at 13-45.
49. Id. § 2.10, at 5.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985).
53. Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1942); Essick v. Lexington,
232 N.C. 200, 60 S.E.2d 106 (1950). See LARSON, supra note 42, §§ 65.11 and
65.14.
[Vol. 14:261
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a co-employee whose negligence caused the injury.54 However,
there are times when an employee may bring a civil action to re-
cover for his injuries during the course of his employment. Under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2, an employee may sue third parties who
are strangers to the employment. 5 Also, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina has intimated that an employee may sue a co-em-
ployee where the co-employee acted with the intent to injure
him. 6 In a court of appeals case, it was held that an intentional
tort amounting to an assault by a co-employee removes the co-em-
ployee from the immunity of the Act.51 This latter option was ex-
tended in Pleasant v. Johnson to include claims against co-em-
ployees when the employee is injured by the willful, wanton, and
reckless negligence of the co-employee. Pleasant overruled earlier
cases which required actual intent by the co-employee to injure the
employee. 8
The court in Pleasant specifically noted that it did not decide
whether an employer may be sued in a civil action for his willful,
wanton and reckless negligence.59 However, the court in Pleasant
did hold that allowing a suit by an employee against his employer
for gross, willful and wanton negligence, would skew the balance of
interests inherent in the Act.6 0 In Barrino v. Radiator Specialty
Co., the court stated that, although Pleasant overruled the court's
prior holdings in Wesley v. Lea, and Warner v. Leder, regarding
suits against employees for willful and wanton negligence, the
holding of those cases pertaining to the liability of employers still
54. Strickland v. King, 293 N.C. 731, 239 S.E.2d 243 (1977); Altman v. Sand-
ers, 267 N.C. 158, 148 S.E.2d 21 (1966); Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d
6 (1952). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9 (1985) provides:
Every employer subject to the compensation provisions of this Article
shall secure the payment of compensation to his employees in the man-
ner hereinafter provided; and while such security remains in force, he or
those conducting his business shall only be liable to any employee for
personal injury or death by accident to the extent and manner herein
specified.
55. Jackson v. Bobbitt, 253 N.C. 670, 117 S.E.2d 806 (1961); Warner, 234
N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1952).
56. Wesley v. Lea, 252 N.C. 540, 114 S.E.2d 350 (1960); Warner, 234 N.C.
727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1942).
57. Andrews v. Peters, 55 N.C. App. 124, 284 S.E.2d 748 (1981); disc. rev.
denied, 305 N.C. 395, 290 S.E.2d 364 (1982).
58. Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985).
59. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 250.
60. Id.
1992]
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remained, in that "[tihe acceptance of benefits under the Act fore-
closes the right of the employee to maintain a common law action.
. against the employer .... -1 In the past, the exclusivity provi-
sion barred both compensatory and punitive damages.6 2
In the case at hand, the supreme court has once again widened
the scope of an employee's remedies and has overruled the Barrino
case, which refused to allow an employee to bring a civil action
against his employer." Today, when an employer knows that his
conduct is substantially certain to result in injury or death to an
employee, such conduct is tantamount to an intentional tort and
the employee may bring a civil action against the employer al-
though the injury or death is covered by the Act and there is pre-
sent compliance with the Act." A plaintiff will not be required to
chose between a workers' compensation claim and a civil action,
but will be allowed to pursue them simultaneously.65
ANALYSIS
In Woodson, the court held that the evidence tended to show
that the employee's death was the result of intentional conduct by
the employer, which the employer knew was substantially certain
to cause injury.6 Next, the court concluded that this conduct was
tantamount to an intentional tort. 7 The court then held that the
plaintiff could pursue her workers' compensation claim and her
civil action simultaneously. 8 The employee did not have to elect
between them because the evidence tended to show that the em-
ployee's death was the result of both an "accident" under the Act
and an intentional tort and because the Act's exclusivity provision
does not shield the employer from civil liability for an intentional
tort.6 9 However, the plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery, and
thus may not receive a double recovery under both the workers'
61. Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 315 N.C. 500, 513, 340 S.E.2d 295, 303
(1986).
62. LARSON, supra note 44, § 65.37, at 12-36. See also Barrino, 315 N.C. 500,
340 S.E.2d 295 (holding a claim for punitive damages is also subject to the bar of
the exclusivity provision).
63. Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 334, 349, 407 S.E.2d 224, 233 (1991).
64. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228.
65. Id. at 341, 407 S.E.2d at 228.
66. Id. at 337, 407 S.E.2d at 226.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
[Vol. 14:261268
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compensation claim and the civil action.70
The court began its analysis with the statutory construction
principle which ensures that the purpose of the legislature is given
effect.71 The court recognized that the Act tries to balance compet-
ing interests of employers and employees and to implement trade-
offs between them. It provides the employee with certain recov-
ery without having to prove that the employer was negligent in the
face of affirmative defenses such as the fellow servant rule and con-
tributory negligence. 3 In return, the Act limits the liability of the
employer by limiting the amount of recovery available to the em-
ployee for work-related injuries and removes the employee's right
to pursue a civil action, which might result in larger damages
awards. 74 However, the court did not find that the legislature in-
tended to relieve employers of civil liability for intentional torts
resulting in injury or death of employees. 7 The court held that
"[i]n such cases, the injury or death is considered to be both by
accident, for which the employee or personal representative may
pursue a compensation claim under the Act, and the result of an
intentional tort, for which a civil action against the employer may
be maintained. 76The court adopted Prosser's definition of intent which extends
"not only to those consequences which are desired, but also to
those which the actor believes are substantially certain to follow
from what the actor does."' 77 Under general concepts of tort liabil-
ity, one who intentionally engages in conduct with the knowledge
that certain results are substantially certain to occur, is held to
intend the results for purposes of tort liability. 78 This is a higher
threshold for civil recovery against employers than co-employees
70. Id.
71. Id. at 338, 407 S.E.2d at 227; Elec. Supply Co. v. Swain Electrical Co., 328
N.C. 651, 403 S.E.2d 291 (1991).
72. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 338, 407 S.E.2d at 227.
73. Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985).
74. Id. at 712, 325 S.E.2d at 246-47 (citing 1 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION § 2.20 (1984)).
75. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 338-39, 407 S.E.2d at 227.
76. Id. at 339, 407 S.E.2d at 227.
77. Id. at 340, 407 S.E.2d at 229; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 8A (4th ed. 1971). Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8 (4th
ed. 1971) and WILLLIAM L. PROSSER AND ARTHUR KEETON ON TORTS § 8, at 35 (5th
ed. 1984).
78. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340, 407 S.E.2d at 229; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 8A and cmt. b (1965).
1992]
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because co-employees, unlike employers, do not finance or other-
wise directly participate in workers' compensation programs.7 ' The
court concluded that "[tihe substantial certainty standard satisfies
the Act's purposes of providing trade-offs to competing interests
and balancing these interests, while serving as a deterrent to inten-
tional wrongdoing and promoting safety in the workplace." 80 The
court went on to analyze the issue according to the holdings of sev-
eral other jurisdictions which had considered how egregious the
employer's misconduct must be to justify civil recovery from the
employer.81 The court found that both the courts and legislatures
in a fair number of other jurisdictions do not require actual intent
to harm for an employer's conduct to be actionable in tort and
outside the protection of the exclusivity provisions of workers'
compensation. 2
The court applied the substantial certainty standard to the
facts of the case and concluded that the following factors all con-
verge to make the plaintiff's evidence sufficient to survive sum-
mary judgment: (1) Morris Rowland's knowledge and disregard of
the dangers associated with trenching itself; (2) his presence at the
site with adequate opportunity to discover such hazards; (3) his
direction to his employees to proceed with the work in the absence
of the required safety procedures; (4) the opinion of the foreman
for Davidson-& Jones, that the trench was unsafe; and (5) a scien-
tific soil analysis by agronomist James Rees, submitted by the
plaintiff in an affidavit on the status of the soil where the cave-in
occurred which stated that the trench "had an exceedingly high
probability of failure, and the trench was substantially certain to
fail." 83 The court determined that Morris Rowland could be held
individually liable along with Rowland Utility, because corporate
officers are treated the same as their corporate employer for appli-
cation of the exclusivity principle.8 The court concluded that
Rowland Utility's liability is dependent on the actions of Morris
Rowland under concepts of agency relationship under the doctrine
of respondeat superior and thus the motion of Morris Rowland for
79. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 342, 407 S.E.2d 229; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-93
(1985).
80. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 342, 407 S.E.2d at 229; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-
126(b)(2) (1985).
81. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 342-44, 407 S.E.2d at 229-30.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 344-46, 407 S.E.2d 231-32.
84. Id. at 347-48, 407 S.E.2d at 232-33.
[Vol. 14:261
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summary judgment should also be denied. 6
The court went on to explain its reasons for allowing the
plaintiff to pursue her workers' compensation claim because the in-
jury to the decedent was the result of an "accident" as used under
the Act. 6 "Accident" under the Act means "(1) an unlooked for
and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the in-
jured employee; (2) a result produced by a fortuitous cause." 87 Em-
ployees certainly do not expect to be injured from the intentional
torts of their employer while on the job, and therefore such injuries
are "unlooked for and untoward events."88 Thus, the employee is
allowed to treat such injuries as accidental under the Act and may
accept the benefits of workers' compensation.89 Therefore, there is
no inherent inconsistency in the plaintiff's pursuit of a civil action
and a workers' compensation claim.90
According to Larson, inherent inconsistency is one of the es-
sential elements of an election of remedies defense for the em-
ployer." Since an inherent inconsistency is lacking, the doctrine of
election of remedies does not require the plaintiff to chose between
the common law and statutory remedies.92 The court then over-
ruled prior cases which held that simultaneous pursuit of a civil
action and a workers' compensation claim is not allowed.93
In this case there was no election of remedies problem as
presented in Barrino, because the plaintiff received no benefits
under the Act while she pursued her civil suit.9 ' A worker is enti-
tled to only one recovery in order to prevent double redress for a
85. Id.
86. Id. at 348, 407 S.E.2d at 233.
87. Id. at 348, 407 S.E.2d at 233; Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C.
427, 428, 1124 S.E.2d 109, 110-11 (1962); see Rhinehart v. Market, 271 N.C. 586,
157 S.E.2d 1 (1967).
88. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 233, 407 S.E.2d at 348; Harding, 256 N.C. at 428,
134 S.E.2d at 110-11.
89. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 233, 407 S.E.2d at 348; See Pleasant v. Johnson,
312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985) and cases cited therein; Warner v. Leder, 234
N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1952); Andrews v. Peters, 55 N.C. App. 124, 284 S.E.2d 748
(1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 395, 290 S.E.2d 364 (1982) (cited with approval
in Pleasant).
90. Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 315 N.C. 500, 522, 340 S.E.2d 295, 308
(1986) (Martin, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233.
94. Id. at 348, 407 S.E.2d at 233.
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single wrong, which is the goal of the election doctrine.9 5 Also,
double recovery can be avoided by requiring an employee to reim-
burse the workers' compensation carrier to the extent of benefits
paid to the employee or by reducing the plaintiff's recovery in tort
by the amount already received, if he recovers against his employer
in a civil action.9 6
The court went on to support its result as a more equitable
one than forcing an employee injured by the intentional miscon-
duct of his employer to elect a common law claim and to forgo his
workers' compensation claim.97 An injured employee with financial
difficulties may have no real alternative other than accepting work-
ers' compensation benefits giving up his tort claim, without making
any real choice between one remedy or the other.9 The doctrine of
election of remedies presupposes a "choice" between remedies.99
An employee who is in severe economic straits and makes a deci-
sion based on the exigencies of his immediate situation cannot be
said to have freely "chosen" one remedy over another.100 Also, such
a policy under the election of remedies doctrine would not discour-
age intentional misconduct by employers.'' After Woodson, the
plaintiff does not have to prove that the employer intended that a
particular employee would be the victim, or that death, or some
other particular harm, would result. 02 It is enough for there to be
a substantial certainty that the employers' actions would cause in-
jury or death. 03
The dissent in Woodson disagreed with the majority's holding
that the exclusivity provision of the Act does not apply, and that
the plaintiff may recover in a civil action against the employer for
conduct substantially certain to cause injury to an employee.' 0 '
However, the dissent conceded that the majority's holding repre-
95. Id. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233. See also Smith v. Oil Corp., 239 N.C. 360,
79 S.E.2d 880 (1964) (holding that allowing worker to pursue both remedies does
not run afoul of goal of election doctrine, which is to prevent double redress of a
single wrong).
96. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 315 N.C. 500, 522, 340 S.E.2d 295,
308 (1986) (Martin, J., dissenting).
101. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233.
102. See also Fallis v. Ins. Co., 247 N.C. 72, 100 S.E.2d 214 (1957).
103. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228.
104. Id. at 362, 407 S.E.2d at 241.
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sented both reasonable and desirable social policy. 0 5 Still, the dis-
sent agreed with the court of appeals' decision, which quoted
Pleasant, stating that "[c]hanges in the Act's delicate balance of
interests is more properly a legislative prerogative than a judicial
function."10 6 The dissent claimed that allowing an employee to
bring a civil action against the employer for even gross, willful and
wanton negligence, would upset the balance of interests between
employers and employees under the Act.10 7
The court should be concerned with the deterrence of inten-
tional employer conduct which is likely to endanger the lives and
safety of workers.0 8 We should not allow an employer to assume
that the Act will insulate him from liability no matter how egre-
gious and deliberate his misconduct. 0 9 To do so would be to con-
tradict the policy of the legislature in promoting worker safety.110
To allow an employer to insure himself against liability for inten-
tional torts would be to encourage him to weigh the costs of safety
against the costs of workers' compensation insurance and to choose
the most cost-efficient course of conduct.'1 Such a policy would
not discourage intentional misconduct by employers."' Also, the.
court has held that an insured cannot protect himself from liability
for his intentional or criminal wrongs through insurance." 3 Fur-
thermore, there is no inherent inconsistency in a plaintiff's effort
to recover for the intentional misconduct of the employer and com-
pensation under the Act."" As the court reasoned, the same con-
duct may be both the result of intentional conduct and an accident
under the Act.115 The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Daniels
v. Swofford, held that "[a]n unexpected assault may be considered
an accident despite its characterization as an intentional tort.""' 6
The laws of North Carolina have provided the employee with both
105. Id.
106. Woodson v. Rowland, 92 N.C. App. 38, 42, 373 S.E.2d 674, 677. See gen-
erally Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985).
107. Woodson, 92 N.C. App. at 42, 373 S.E.2d at 674.
108. Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 315 N.C. 500, 519, 340 S.E.2d 295, 306
(1986) (Martin, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-126(b)(2) (1981).
111. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 519, 340 S.E.2d at 306 (Martin, J., dissenting)..
112. Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 334, 349, 407 S.E.2d 224, 233.
113. Blackwell v. Ins. Co., 234 N.C. 559, 67 S.E.2d 750 (1951).
114. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 519, 340 S.E.2d at 306 (Martin, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
116. Daniels v. Swofford, 55 N.C. App. 555, 558, 286 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1982).
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a common law and a statutory remedy, and the employee is not
forced to make a choice between the two. 1
7
CONCLUSION
After Woodson, the family of an injured employee may bring a
civil action against the employer to recover damages for the death
or injury of the employee, although coverage and compliance under
the Act exist. The court in Woodson refused to follow previous
case law which held that simultaneous pursuit of a civil action and
workers' compensation is not allowed. The holding in Woodson is
perhaps the most reasonable and desirable social policy for anyone
who agrees that the employer should be fully liable for intentional
misconduct which results in injury or death to employees.
Debbie Collins
117. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 522, 340 S.E.2d at 308 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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